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bobtufo
Nov 11, 2003, 1:31 AM
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I appreciate the attention given by RMRU and everyone with regard to speculation and investigation to determine what happened to Dave and Kelly. I am reading it all with interest to all details. Even if we never know exactly what happened, I would like to believe that if a future climber can be safer by examining this thread, this should continue as long as it needs to continue. It will not bring them back, but another life could be saved. There may be lessons in any of the speculations presented. I am definitely in favor of helping anyone, who may learn valuable information here. Thank you. Toni Tufo
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sharpender
Nov 11, 2003, 2:33 AM
Post #177 of 221
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Although the scenario I am about to desrcibe does not closely fit the configuration of belay anchors described here, it is a potential danger to climbers finishing a climb. I had led the last pitch of Wong Climb and belayed my partner until he walked past me to flatter ground. I then cleaned my anchors and walked over to join him still roped. I may or may not have untied from the rope. Then I began to pull up the rope that lay snaking from the position of the anchors up to where my partner had walked. The rope caught on a block of rock. The ground sloped gently down and included a step off a small ledge to where I needed to free the rope. I reached down and lifted the rope out of a small crevasse. As I straightened back up I felt a tug, pulling me down and slightly off balance. the thought raced through my mind that I could be pulled off the rock unprotected. I froze and looked to see that the sling around my shoulder had snagged on the corner of a block. I leaned down carefully and freed it before standing back up. The ground was sufficently angled that had I been pulled from my feet by this unexpected tug I could have tumbled and fell toward the edge until I had no way to stop a fatal fall. And if my partner were still tied into the other end of the line, he too would have been swept off the rock. This danger is possibly faced by all climbers topping out after a multi-pitch climb. I almost always make a practice of getting my partners permission to take him/her off belay at the top of a climb, before I break down anchors. I will now add awareness that my partner is clear of the rope. I did not do it that day because we topped out at sunset and faced a down climb of the North Gully in the dark. I am not at all suggesting what I think happened to Dave and Kelly. This thread has simply brought back awareness of how close I may have come to a fatal accident my self. Climb safely everyone.
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rgold
Nov 11, 2003, 4:08 AM
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In reply to: an eight to ten foot fall generates more impact force than you would think.
An 80 kg climber falling 10 feet with 30 feet of rope out suffers a fall factor 1/3 fall. If the rope has an impact force rating of 9kN, then such a fall will generate about 4.4 kN peak tension, or nearly 1,000 lbf. We like to think that a single decent piece of pro will handle this much, so the extraction of a three-piece anchor is still something of a shock---if fully equalized, each piece would have failed at 330 lbf or less.
However, the entire concept of equalization is something of a myth, and it is easy for a slightly imperfectly tied cordalette rig to transfer the entire initial load to the middle piece, even assuming the force comes from the expected direction. Moreover, if one of the end pieces is bad and blows, then no matter how the cordalette is tied, the entire load is transferred to the middle piece and thence to the remaining piece, in other words a cascade failure is possible.
Even in the worst possible cascade failure, the three pieces still have to fail at or near 1,000 lbf, which seems very unlikely although not, sadly, impossible.
There is a way that the anchor could have been subjected to much higher forces. It was mentioned that the anchor was low. This and the casualness of the situation might have led the belayer to belay in such a way that the cordalette was slack. The impact of the fall could then have caused the belayer to take a leader fall on the cordalette, which could easily be of fall factor 1 or higher. I have read in one of the issues of the UIAA journal that the webbing in Petzl quickdraws has an impact force rating of 18 kN. Using this number for the cordalette, and assuming a fall factor of 1 (power point of cordalette up by anchors) the anchors might have been subjected to a 14 kN jolt, i.e. more than 3000 lbf.
My heart goes out to the friends and family of the climbers. There is no consolation whatsoever in being the victims of an unlikely sequence of events. As climbers, our love of life is expressed in the playing of a game that often seems safe enough, although danger lurks in the crumbling of a crystal and the deformation of a cam. Those left behind to mourn cannot help but wonder whether they can avoid a similar fate. Kiss your family when you leave, embrace them when you return, and be thankful for the bounties of life.
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neeshman
Nov 11, 2003, 5:45 AM
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Wow. This thread has been so amazing. The entire thing. Great job Jeff and all you other guys that have done so much thinking and research on the topic. Thats wonderful of you. Keep up the good work.
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vivalargo
Nov 11, 2003, 7:17 AM
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Friends,
As has been pointed out to me, by a dozen folks, I've bungled some names in my posts per the accident breakdown. Sadly, I have to dash off these posts during breaks at work, and don't have time to compose things as I'd like. I trust the ideas are clear and make sense. I thought the thing through as weel as I possibly could, given the information provided by many folks.
My last thought here is that in light of the comprehensive load breakdown on the anchors provided today, a swinging, lateral fall, as most likely happened, would impact the anchor in a radial arc. A cordalette is often rigged without a directional, as I believe was the case in the accident, and when this is the configuration, one piece usually absorbs the load. When that load is oblique, a sideways pull, cams can and will rip out in flash, leaving the impact to shockload, also at oblique angles, onto the remaining pieces. And under these circumstances, a 1,000 pounds of loading is plenty to cause anchor failure if the placements are less than ideal. This also explains the deformation of the cams.
In light of these comments and the very savy detective work by Jeff, the RMRU, and all others, I honestly think this is as far as this can go and still be instructive. There's no end of how far one might try and reconstruct just how the anchor was placed, and exactly where someone might have slipped, but in general terms, I feel the accident has been fairly explained.
Lastly, I offer my thanks for all those who provided clues to unraveling this tragic accident, and my condolences go to all those touched by the passing of two fellow climbers. The sense of community shown in this thread has restored my confidence that climbing is more than mere sport.
JL
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papounet
Nov 11, 2003, 2:04 PM
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dear
thank you for the attempts at in-depth analysis of the causes behind the death of our two fellow climbers, Dan and Kelly.
It will perhaps serve to re-assess some of the tenets of anchor-building, and make our activities safer.
After seing the pics of the anchor setup and the description of the state of the cams, I could not help remember a thread on
Equalized vs. Pseudo Equalized Anchors http://www.rockclimbing.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=36371&postdays=0&postorder=asc&topic_view=&start=0
which started with
In reply to: Let's start off by building a simple three point self equalizing anchor. Take three cams in perfect placements, and a long piece of cordelette tied end to end using a grapevine knot.
For obvious reasons, I am off to that thread to discuss anchors.
The discussion done there will be done in memory of Dave and Kelly.
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idyllclmbr
Nov 11, 2003, 5:54 PM
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I think we're missing the BIG picture!
You all made some very good points. I read the report and I have a different interpretation. I figured David and Kelly were on the last pitch of the White Maiden. David belayed Kelly to his belay point and from there they decided to solo to the top, cleaned up and someone tripped. I've been climbing for over 30 years and I think back on how many times I've seen climbers finishing a hard climb by just soloing the last easy part, this climb included. This is a lesson to learn in itself!
I feel that we need to let the families have peace, learn what we can from this and move on.
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howdyjeff
Nov 11, 2003, 10:34 PM
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idyllclmbr,
Yes, that's one of the ways I read the report as well--that the climbers finished part of the way up the final slab, whether from White Maiden or The Step, then walked up, unbelayed, the rest of the way. Both climbs finish on the same slab, although there is a variation of White Maiden that finishes straight above Fool’s Rush. That’s why I’m interested in seeing exactly where the skid marks and impact point found are located. That’s the very final and most conclusive bit of evidence.
To clarify this, I asked the investigator I spoke with, and he said that RMRU believes the climbers had finished the climb and both made it to the belay on top. It was unclear to me, though, where he thought the climbers were walking when they fell. Part of the problem here is that we may be talking about slightly different things. If by saying the climbers finished The Step the report means simply that they got to the top of pitch 3, then traversing over to and finishing on White Maiden makes sense. That’s why I’m concerned with finding out more precisely where the skid marks are. As I suggested in a previous report, if they are way over by White Maiden/Fool’s Rush, then all bets are off on my speculation about a fall below the belay for the Step.
Unfortunately, the investigator I spoke with (the team leader, who may also have written the report--I don’t know) said he was not one of the folks up on top and did not eyeball the skid marks or impact point. I asked him to refer my photos and topo to someone who could better point out exactly where they found the marks, but I have not heard back yet. Anyway, “60 feet from the top,” without any reference to where the marks are located laterally, in the vicinity of which route or rock feature, doesn’t do it for me. Someone with the RMRU knows, and it is simply a matter of hearing from them. Unfortunately, they’ve got other stuff going on, too, and we’ll just have to be patient.
But I think this is pretty important, and I have come to realize that it’s going to bug me, at least, until I feel that we’ve come to a conclusion, which may (or may not) mean finally locating the skid marks. This story has generated enough interest within the climbing community to have garnered the attention of a representative from one of the major climbing magazines, who is writing an article about it, and I think she, and others, would agree. In my estimation, we’re not quite done here until we get clear on this last bit of crucial evidence. If this seems like dragging things out, or failing to move on or give peace to anyone, then I would encourage them simply to take the official report at face value and not view the thread anymore.
Regardless, after the report was released, I considered the scenario that says the climbers finished on White Maiden. They would have had to exit The Step at the top of pitch 3, traversing down and left to Fool’s Rush, then climbing up to White Maiden. To me, this seems like something of a detour, instead of simply going straight up the route on which they’d already passed the crux and now faced, at it’s most difficult, a section of 5.7 climbing.
In the guidebook (1993 edition, which is what Dave had in his pack at the bottom of the route), the topo shows two options for The Step from pitch 3. One is an arrow pointing up and left that says “To White Maiden,” supposedly referring the reader to the topo for that route which is on another page. The other option, though marked “VAR.” (variation), goes up and right, joining Super Pooper to the top of the topo on the same page. Personally, I’ve always considered the latter to be the shortest and most obvious and direct finish to The Step, from the point of view of the topo, as well as looking up from pitch 3 on the climb itself. All the climbers I know tend in general to prefer going up, rather than across and down. Add to that the fact, as I mentioned, that Dave had climbed Super Pooper with me in the past, whose finish The Step joins a few moves from the top of pitch 3, and my assumption has been that he would have finished on what I have always considered to be the final pitch “shared” by both climbs. I could be wrong, though.
If the two did finish on White Maiden, I think they would have gone up the right-arching, crack/slab fingertip traverse and over the small roof to the final slab shared by the finish of Super Pooper and the Step, which is the most obvious and popular finish of that route. If that’s the case, especially given Kelly’s level of ability, I highly doubt that they would have soloed the bottom section of this pitch below the arch and over the small roof. True, the slab above is easier, but as on The Step, there is no place for a belay there that would be consistent with the anchor gear found, between the start of the last pitch on White Maiden and the top belay it shares with The Step. Besides, it’s hard to believe that the climbers would solo, or even walk far, still roped together, with the rope in the belay device, and with anchor cords and gear dangling around down at Dave’s feet, or even in hand. It has never occurred to me to solo the remaining section of either White Maiden or The Step, and Dave has never done that with me, either—we’ve always just gone to the belay on top. Even if Dave traversed the final slab up and right and belayed Kelly at the same spot as that for the The Step, then a follower fall here, too, would amount to as much as we have discussed regarding a follower fall on The Step. In this case though, the last lead gear placements are at the small roof, and as the final pitch of White Maiden approaches the belay from an even more oblique angle, the possible swing would be even greater.
The only other finish of White Maiden continues straight up above where Fool’s Rush joins that route. While I’ve done the other finish probably ten or fifteen times over the seven years I’ve been climbing at Tahquitz, I’ve only done this finish once, at the beginning of this season in fact. It climbs straight up some awkward, bulging rock via shallow, insecure crack and stemming moves, 5.7 in the book. I think this ends steeply on a flat among boulders, with no slab, and nowhere to walk except back from the edge between the boulders. I would very highly doubt that the climbers would be soloing anything here, particularly as you can’t really see much of the pitch above the first short section.
Finally, and most telling perhaps, is that the sizes of gear on Kelly’s harness do not seem to match pitch 3 of The Step, which would be the case if the two traversed from the top of pitch 3, then soloed up Fool’s Rush/White Maiden. Nor do they match the arching fingertip traverse to the short roof on White Maiden, or, I think, the pitch on White Maiden that continues straight up above Fool’s Rush. If the skid marks turn out to be located anywhere left of the short roof on White Maiden, then we may have to re-examine our facts and assumptions entirely. Whether we will have the motivation to do that remains to be seen.
One interesting thing about this. It is the RMRU’s job to officially investigate such an incident, but for very understandable, practical purposes, their motivations and energies are limited. They are volunteers, with lives of their own, and judging by their website, they have already become involved in subsequent incidents. I would hope that they don’t view our efforts as stepping on their toes or questioning their judgment in any way. We are not. I hope, instead, they would be interested that we are trying to find an explanation as close to the truth as possible, as they also try to do.
But often, I suppose, it is up to climbing friends and other interested parties connected with such an incident, who have a different motivation and different knowledge of the climbers, the routes, and the rock, to decide whether to dig more deeply if something seems unclear or feels wrong. I have done so in order to satisfy my own intellect, feelings, and instincts, as well as to give what I feel is an appropriate level of respect to the memory of Dave and Kelly as extremely competent climbers and complex human beings, and to those who still climb.
You’ve just got to wonder how many such cases are looked at in simple helpless shock by everyone closely involved, and which are then investigated and conclusions reached that because of practical limitations determine simply that “climbers slipped and fell,” and which conclusions are accepted simply because they are “official,” rather than trying to figure out and tell something as close as possible to the real story. If this had happened to me, I know that Dave, as a person and a climber, would have felt the same responsibility and had the same motivation to try to tell my story.
Jeff
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philbox
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Nov 11, 2003, 10:43 PM
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Actually I think that the big picture has NOT been missed. I believe that the discussion of the various anchor failure modes is what will save lives in the future. Without this type of discussion others will be doomed to repeat mistakes and suffer tragedy for no reason. I mean no flames by saying this either. I just would not like to see the discussion shut down prematurely.
I am eternally grateful for the forebearance of family members who have allowed this discussion to move forward. Kelly and Dave will not have died in vain. Their unfortunate accident will go a long way towards educating many for a long time into the future. This thread is in some way a fitting memorial to them.
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artm
Nov 11, 2003, 11:16 PM
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In reply to: But often, I suppose, it is up to climbing friends and other interested parties connected with such an incident, who have a different motivation and different knowledge of the climbers, the routes, and the rock, to decide whether to dig more deeply if something seems unclear or feels wrong. I have done so in order to satisfy my own intellect, feelings, and instincts, as well as to give what I feel is an appropriate level of respect to the memory of Dave and Kelly as extremely competent climbers and complex human beings, and to those who still climb. You’ve just got to wonder how many such cases are looked at in simple helpless shock by everyone closely involved, and which are then investigated and conclusions reached that because of practical limitations determine simply that “climbers slipped and fell,” and which conclusions are accepted simply because they are “official,” rather than trying to figure out and tell something as close as possible to the real story. If this had happened to me, I know that Dave, as a person and a climber, would have felt the same responsibility and had the same motivation to try to tell my story. Jeff
I feel the same way and am positive that most of my partners and friends do also.
I agree that the RMRU report "feels wrong".
The conclusions the report draws counter much of my own(and my partners) habits and that of many of the climbers I know.
As Dave's friend and partner you are obviously much more aware of his climbing habits and skills than any of the rest of us, this combined with an extensive knowledge of the routes/area in question makes your inquiry the best bet for any answers. IMHO
Thanks for doing this Jeff I know it must be painful.
Art
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cjain
Nov 12, 2003, 3:01 AM
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In reply to: ... Besides, it’s hard to believe that the climbers would solo, or even walk far, still roped together, with the rope in the belay device, and with anchor cords and gear dangling around down at Dave’s feet, or even in hand. ... Jeff
Yes, I find this to be most implausible as well. When I first read the RMRU report, I was surprised that anyone would solo the last part of a climb still roped together, instead of coiling the rope which seems to be standard practice when you're "done" with the rope. I don't know about anyone else, but I automatically assumed that part of the basis for this conclusion was that the cordelette must have been bundled for walking...
Thanks to all who are continuing to look into this.
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roseraie
Nov 12, 2003, 4:53 AM
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My problem with the RMRU report thus far is that it ignores crucial pieces of information. Some of these facts have been attributed to being misseen or misheard in the moment, others have been completely disregarded (and not explained).
-The two men were still tied together.
-Adam (and "Leslie") heard gear "thunking" out.
-The topography of the top-out to the climbs in reference (White Maiden and The Step) is not one where falling is likely, or maybe even possible (see Jeff's description of the low-angle slab), after the removal of the anchor.
-Dave, after the fall, had the rope through the belay device and his hand on the brake end.
-Adam can attest that there was an equalized cordalette, with THREE cams on it, attached to Dave. (Also, Adam took home with him one caribiner, which he has since returned to Florabel, which is the CARIBINER MISSING FROM THE CAM THE RMRU BELIEVES THE MEN WERE RACKING AS THEY WALKED.)
-Dave was an experienced climber, and no experienced climber, even a ballsy one who would solo the last pitch of a multipitch route, would solo with the rope and the anchor hanging from his harness.
I am not a very experienced climber. I could count the number of multipitch climbs I had done before Oct. 19 on one hand. But I see these inconsistencies and it makes it obvious to me that not every piece of evidence was taken into account. PLEASE don't get me wrong, I am SO INCREDIBLY GRATEFUL to the RMRU for everything they did that day, and for everything they do every day. (THANK YOU, Glenn, and everyone else.) Jeff said it well, they are VOLUNTEERS. There is just this need in me, and in our community, to figure out what happened in this incident... for personal purposes of closure, and for the knowledge of the entire climbing community.
Meg
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adamzappal
Nov 12, 2003, 5:59 AM
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You know I was thinking about it again, i could almost swear I saw TWO size .5 Camelots on that anchor. I can be wrong; I could have been trippin and mistaken the extra .5 on his harness as the additional one on his anchor ???
The other piece I know was size 1 (the locking i left on the anchor)
At the coroners office I did not see that locking unless they took it off and clipped it to the harness with his other lockings. This is one other thing I am confused about. But it is beside the point; there was a size 1 with a locking on there. period
His right hand was not really holding on to the rope, but the rope was running from the belay device up through his open palm pinched between the rope under tension and his chest. The rope was coming over his right shoulder and underneath his back where the anchor was.
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mtnrsq
Nov 12, 2003, 5:14 PM
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I think that the continuing discussion on the accident is useful and has already yielded good info. re: anchor building/equalization.
If anyone is going to check out the physical evidence on the rock, you may find that recent weather has obliterated anything obvious.
Remember John's post re: going from the macro to the micro. It should all "fit" together to at least frame a picture that passes a gut level validity check. Dynamic events like falls introduce so many variables that the specifics will not be known with exactness. Any event that introduces unexpected directional forces presents HUGE problems on gear/placements.
Glenn and many of the other RMRU folks are very experienced climbers and have significant experience at Tahquitz/Suicide. Like you, they want to present as accurate a picture as possible as to cause. I would encourage you to continue the discussion with them and others.
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vivalargo
Nov 12, 2003, 5:55 PM
Post #190 of 221
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I agree with Jeff that to close this case we need to know the exact location of the skid marks and impact point "60-feet below the top," and establish same on a photograph. Skid marks on a lichen-covered slab can be the work of most anyone, but when an impact point is directly below, this starts painting a pretty convincing picture for being the accident site.
So some from from the RMRU needs to speak up. Everyone's busy. Relating this information can only take a minute and one sentense.
Lastly, when you're honestly engaged in the search for what is true, you can't be afraid of "stepping on anyone's toes." We seem to forget that many of the guys on the RMRU are also active climbers, and this is not an "us" and "them" situation. We're all on the same rope here.
JL
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howdyjeff
Nov 12, 2003, 7:12 PM
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mtnrsq,
Thanks for your support. I think this has been a huge learning experience for everyone--and not just about climbing, either. Everyone involved in the discussion can be very proud of the fact that I’ve already received email from a number of mountain rescue personnel from around the country thanking us for how educational and insightful the discussion has been, and how it will help them in their approach to their own future investigations.
I was tempted, but I have since reconsidered my idea of going up to Tahquitz myself over the past couple weekends to try to spot the marks, etc. That's in part because, as I mentioned, I need some distance from the rock right now, I don't want to go hunting around for something I may never find, and I'll be happy to just hear it from someone who was there during the investigation and who knows. And, of course, I have always much preferred going up the rock, rather than going down from the top—yikes!
I don't feel like I'm the only one trying to get clear about a few things still. But, really, we also don’t need to be so urgent about it either—I’m cautioning myself here. I think it's going to be tough, bringing in stuff like people's memories of what they thought they heard even before they knew what was going on, or even memories about what gear was where, afterward. It was a hugely stressful event for those of you on the scene. From my own experience in a similar situation, things get frantic and happen too fast to have a very clear recollection about certain aspects of such an incident. Anyway, I think that we’re almost done based simply on the physical evidence. Personally, I’ve promised myself to close the book on this as soon as we see where the skid marks were found. And remember what I suggested about the fact that I don’t think that any of us will feel entirely satisfied, no matter what conclusions we reach.
I think it may be best to just focus on the hard evidence that we have, and not start second-guessing ourselves so much about what gear was where, but instead take those early reports, when everything was fresh in people’s minds, at face value. The anchor and gear had obviously been taken apart by the time I photographed it, but Adam’s photos show that the cord was equalized for three pieces of gear, so let’s stick with that. To what extent things were taken apart doesn’t really matter now, because we simply won’t be able to reliably reconstruct it. For future reference, John’s point in an earlier post about trying to preserve the configuration of everything as much as possible at every step along the way is very relevant to climbers and investigators alike. But when you’re on the scene of something like this, you are most concerned with helping save lives, not so much with preserving everything for evidence afterward, and that’s understandable.
I think that we’ll soon hear about the skid marks and be able to wrap this up. In any case, the possible conclusions will remain the same: the climbers slipped and fell while cleaning things up, or maybe a belay pulled.
Thanks everyone for being patient with us,
Jeff
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byterock
Nov 12, 2003, 8:10 PM
Post #192 of 221
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A simple question one that I might of missed in one of the posts.
Was the Belay device seen in the picture above attached to the rope then and then directly attched to the climber's harness?
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pixelguru
Nov 12, 2003, 8:32 PM
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In reply to: Climbers know that Dave would almost certainly have taken Kelly off belay before breaking down the belay anchor gear. But the rope was found still in Dave’s device after the fall. And the belay cords and gear had not been gathered up or reracked. |
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adamzappal
Nov 12, 2003, 10:31 PM
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In reply to: A simple question one that I might of missed in one of the posts. Was the Belay device seen in the picture above attached to the rope then and then directly attched to the climber's harness?
It was hooked up normally with locking carabiner through the belay loop of the harness.
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byterock
Nov 13, 2003, 2:38 PM
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I asked the question because there have been a number of similar accidents where there has been an unexplained catastrophic anchor or belay failure while using a "Sticht" or plate type belay device (Figure 8, b-52, Reveso etc) directly attached to the climber. As can be seen in the picture below, when the leader passes by the belayer without an immediate protection point the result could be a catastrophic failure.
http://www.petzl.com/...s/Conseil_24_2_2.gif
Another common failure is when the second is being belayed up without a first runner above and within arms reach the plate type belay device. This set up changes the breaking direction for the belayer on the device from an upward pull to a downward pull.
Unfortunately I do not have a pic for this typeof set up handy.
Either on of these scenarios may explain how their belay and anchors failed as both can generate very large fall forces on what may seem to be a very minor fall or slip.
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philbox
Moderator
Nov 14, 2003, 6:03 AM
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This is a repost of an email sent from a non member of this site. This is reproduced with permission from Dan Lehman. I suggested that it should be included here to keep as much as possible of what is written about this accident in one place.
Quote.
Hello, All:
Pardon my e-mail intrusion, but I'm a Read-Only visitor to the
Rockclimbing.com site. I intrude here only to ask about one
point I've not seen come up in the analysis of the accident:
knots.
From the photos posted to the thread, I'd say that the
FIg.8 loopknot (tie-in) on Kelly Tufo's harness appears to be
in a relatively non-stressed form. Note that the load end runs
from lower left under the taped end (which is drawn away over
it to the right) and into the knot such that it makes the INNER
turn around the knot eye legs. (Were it the outer turn, which is
clearly very untensioned, the case would be clearer!) This turn
doesn't seem very tensioned (as it should from a hard fall).
Now note also the Fig.8 bend of the cordelette. This appears
to be 8mm nylon rope, btw.. This knot also has the loaded
ends taking the inner turns (as opposed to the parallel turns
running to extreme reaches of the knot along the line of tension),
but doesn't look particularly heavily tensioned, though snug.
As for the cordelette tie-off/powerpoint knot, a muti-strand
Overhand knot, one might deduce from it that the upper arm
was first or most loaded, and the lowest arm (shown w/'biner
& cam attached) not much or last loaded, as so far as I can
discern, this latter arm's parts bend rather sharply into the
knot leftmost of the six parts; and the upper arm's parts I
think are those apparently most firmly set into the overhand.
So, if my conjecture--and it's of course based only on the
appearance of gear in the photos, and also not with great
experience at how knots look after loading, though I do much
fiddling and stressing of such things--is correct, one concludes
that the fall forces were not so great--either at the climber or
the anchor.
--dl*
====
Unquote.
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howdyjeff
Nov 15, 2003, 10:29 PM
Post #197 of 221
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Registered: Oct 21, 2003
Posts: 14
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Well, I think this one is destined to remain a bit of a mystery. I think that’s fitting too, because something like this should perhaps not, even if it were possible, be wrapped up for climbers quite so neatly. It shouldn’t allow them to walk away from this saying, “it couldn’t happen to me,” or even, “these were exceptional circumstances.” It most certainly was never going to be wrapped up that way for friends, family, and those on the scene.
We could all just keep digging deeper and deeper, but I am reminded of the 1966 classic Antonioni film “Blow Up,” in which a photographer, out snapping random photos in the park one day, later realizes that he might have caught evidence of a murder on film. He begins obsessively blowing up his photos from that day, comparing sequences and angles in his compulsion to see the truth, but just as he reaches the point where he thinks he can almost make out a gun in the bushes, the resolution of the photo reaches it’s limit, and he can’t be sure. He finds other clues, but they disappear or turn out to be open to interpretation. A very “mod,” existential, and unsatisfying, though interesting, film. One of Vanessa Redgrave’s first, I think. Nothing at all to do with climbing.
We, too, could get down to the level of analyzing knots. To answer one of the points in a previous post, the reason that rescuers cut the rope near Kelly’s knot in the first place is that the knot was too tight to untie, suggesting that he did indeed take a very hard fall on it. It begins, then, to become more an exercise in the mysterious, dynamic physics of rock, rope, and metal; the limitations of memory and communication; who saw what evidence and where; factual and textual interpretation and criticism; and just plain diminishing resolution.
In this same vein, I still find myself every once in awhile thinking that I should give Dave a call and get his take on what he thinks happened. As not just a climber, but as a student of climbing, and, yes, sometimes even a climbing “tech weenie,” Dave would undoubtedly have his own insights and opinions on the details. He might look at Adam’s gear photo, for instance, and draw our attention to the configuration of the gold cord. He would point out how the two “outside” loops seem significantly longer than the middle one. So, assuming that the climbers were on belay at the time, and assuming that the pieces were set relatively side by side in the same crack, and assuming that the cord had not been untied and re-tied after the accident, these long outer loops would almost suggest load multiplying angles as opposed to load equalizing ones. Dave was as smart as they come about these things.
And as a former psychology graduate, he would have much interesting to discuss about what happens to our climbing and our lives in the aftermath of something like this. After our technical discussion, we would probably joke together about reports I’ve heard recently that a period of poor climbing, sketchy lead psych, and bad juju has settled over the southern California climbing community. As a friend, a pragmatist, and a wit, though, I hear him ending the discussion emphatically: “Dude. Get over it.”
Focusing on John’s suggestion to go from the macro to the micro, I had begun feeling that the final and most important piece of the puzzle would be learning more exactly where the locations of the skid marks and impact point were. This was important, I felt, because it would place the climbers either on the final slab to the right of the standard finish of White Maiden (i.e. the fingertip traverse over the small roof to the slab) and below the top belay that climb shares with The Step/Super Pooper, which is where I would expect them to have been. Or else it would place them farther to the left, above Fool’s Rush and below the alternate finishes of White Maiden, which is also entirely possible, but unexpected.
An investigator from RMRU sent me a photo last night of where they think the skid marks, impact point, and fall line are located. I have attached it below. Unfortunately, I was looking for something that would indicate a little more closely where, laterally on the rock, under what route or near what feature, they thought these things were located. I’m still not sure about that, but judging from a combination of this photo and the report, I think that they think the marks were left of the slab, perhaps in line with the upper pitches of Fool’s Rush and below the alternate finishes of White Maiden. While the slab is simple, there’s much more featured rock above Fool’s Rush, plenty of places for belays, etc., so even if I were more familiar with those finishes, which I am not, figuring things out there would be infinitely more difficult, or impossible, whether for me, RMRU, or anyone else.
So, I think RMRU’s conclusion suggests that the climbers finished The Step at the top of pitch three, traversed over to Fool’s Rush, and may have been at the top of one of the alternate finishes to White Maiden, wrapping things up on easy ground. Dave could have been above or below Kelly, in the process of taking down the anchor, both climbers feeling comfortable on low-angled terrain, while Kelly walked up the slab above him to flat ground. A slip here, by either climber, could have turned into a tumble, pulling an anchor that was fully or partially still set up, or that was in hand and being put away. I think that’s as far as we can go with that scenario.
For me, there are still the issues of the rope in the belay device, the presence of a belay anchor, the length of rope out between the two, and, if the location of the skid marks and impact point admit the possibility that the climbers finished on either the standard finish of White Maiden or on The Step/Super Pooper, the question of where this belay would have been, etc. I can recall no place on the slab, between the bottom of the last pitch of White Maiden or the bottom of the headwall on The Step/Super Pooper for such a belay, nor would they have had any reason to stop and belay mid-pitch or be walking around much on the slab itself. This, then, would put the climbers at the top belay. Dave would not have any reason, nor was it his habit, to take down an anchor prematurely, with Kelly very far down below him on the slab. After bringing Kelly up to where he was, Dave would take down the belay, and the two would walk a few steps on low-angled slab at the top, from the belay to the flat. It is possible that someone slipped here.
In either scenario, this could have been a belayed or unbelayed fall. A factor two leader fall with no intermediate gear or a follower fall onto an iffy anchor. I leave you to make up your own mind which scenario makes most sense. For me, that’s one good thing about the mystery in this: it allows us to imagine almost anything we want.
A recent post mentioned that we had perhaps gotten away from the big picture by misinterpreting what the official report said. But from the start, I had read the report the way that this post suggested and just about every way in between as well, including doubting it, and I had tried to consider each scenario given the evidence, given what I knew about the routes from personal experience, given what I knew of Dave’s habits as a climber, and given what felt “right” and “wrong” to me regarding where I thought they might have gone and what I thought they would have done.
If we are missing the big picture here, it is probably simply that Dave and Kelly, two experienced and competent climbers, climbing most likely what was fairly easy ground, were killed by what was either a moment of carelessness, or a chance slip, or a combination of both. The carelessness would have been, in my opinion, in setting an anchor that was less than perfect, which climbers sometimes do, as for instance when a leader runs out of rope at the end of a pitch and after searching around, and perhaps even down climbing a bit, must make due with perhaps the only less-than-perfect rock features that present themselves in the vicinity. The problem of rock quality is even tougher, because sometimes rock that looks good and holds up to a couple hard tugs on gear can blow apart in a fall. We have already just about covered all the good technical solutions to this in prior posts, so I won’t repeat them here.
Or the carelessness could have been two climbers, exhilarated but exhausted from having just pulled off yet another personal climbing coup—the crux and aesthetic line of The Step—and anxious to get aching feet out of climbing shoes and get the hell off the rock. Here is something else for the non-climbers trying to understand why we do it: climbing at a place like Tahquitz means being able to simply choose to go have the adventure of a lifetime (really) on any given weekend, just choose to go engage oneself in a significant event, despite the aching feet, the struggles, the scares, the epics, and all. And finishing a climb like this gives you the feeling, temporarily, at least, that you are heroic and invincible. A rare thing these days, I think. Anyway, as climbers we all do it occasionally: start wrapping things up before we are really done, thinking of getting home, getting dinner. We also do it as people in our normal lives in the city, it's just that the consequences are not so great as when we are high up on a steep rock.
But one of the problems with making any sort of conclusion here, based only on some very inconclusive pieces of evidence, is in resisting the urge to also make a value judgment about what happened. I feel that it may be unfair, for instance, to Dave and Kelly even to suggest that they may have been "careless" in setting a less-than-perfect anchor, or in slipping, unbelayed, at the very top. Because given the evidence, I think we just can't really tell exactly what happened. They could, in fact, have been doing everything as "by the book" as any climber ever does under the circumstances.
We have learned some other things from this too, about how to approach assisting in an accident like this in the future, about how an investigation may be conducted afterward, about what level of detail might be expected and what level attained. It has also been therapeutic for those of us closely involved, and I would like to finally thank everyone for indulging us. It has enabled everyone to abstract the event a little, focus on details, and get the sense that we could maybe explain and find, or create, something meaningful from something tragic. I think we’ve done that, but at the same time, I’d like to quote something from an email I wrote earlier, in response to someone who wrote to me saying,
> your posting
> was quite haunting.
Yes, it was haunting for me writing it too, and I spent
some time wondering if it was a bit too much and whether
or not to post it. But a friend who read it said it might help
some of the others who are going through this, so I guess
I'll let it stand. Anyway, I've never been the kind of person
to prefer things like this to be wrapped up neatly. That's
just not how life goes all the time. It was part of what I
felt, and saying it felt more genuine (and difficult) than
simply saying that I got back out onto the rock with renewed
enthusiasm. Much of it might only be temporary, but my
feelings about it are going to determine the reality of it for
me in large part, whether I like it or not. And it looks like
we all don't get to be simply heroic after something like this,
but maybe a little wretched. Climbing becomes for awhile
again children playing high up on rocks with their lives,
despite the care they take. It just so happens to have a vaunted
history, a couple magazines, and some remarkable people
centered around it, but it is still a very weird thing to do.
Very existential, I've always felt.
I don’t know to what extent I’ll regain my own joy for climbing after this. I do know that I’ll always look at it differently now. But I realized the other day, talking about it with some friends, that for me climbing has had a tremendously positive impact on my life over the past seven years. I don’t know what else I would possibly have been doing, but I doubt that it would have been as thrilling, beautiful, or fulfilling as struggling up several hundred feet to sit on an orange sandstone ledge, on a vertical wall at Zion, sharing the view of the canyon and the river with Dave. When non-climbers, as well as we ourselves, wonder why we go out and do something like this, always with the possibility of risk, I still must say that I may not have been as passionate, interesting, and happy a person in my normal life over all those years with family, friends, and others, if it wasn’t for climbing.
I don't think I'll post anything else here, but you never know. If I do, this is where it'll be. If others want to continue posting here, I would suggest that, at very least, they take the time to read the entire thread so as to avoid repeating things (perhaps a good reason in itself to spin off a new thread), as well as simply to respect the whole thing and get the feeling parts too, not just the technical.
Thanks once again to those on the scene, Florabel, RMRU, expert John Long, Alison Osius from Rock & Ice Magazine, and all the others who took a sincere interest in trying to figure this thing out or dropped a line to say sorry. Finally, thanks to my man Dave for all the good times, on and off the rock.
Climb safe everyone!
Jeff
http://www.adventuresportguides.com/dk/Tahquitz_rock.jpg
http://www.adventuresportguides.com/dk/taq1d.jpg
http://www.adventuresportguides.com/dk/taq6d.jpg
My photos:
Dark blue line = “From Bad Traverse” approach to The Step.
Orange line = Super Pooper (belays numbered)
Red line = The Step (belays numbered)
Green line = Fool’s Rush (upper pitches, only)
Yellow line = White Maiden (belays numbered)
Pink line = Exit from The Step to White Maiden
Red dots = My interpretation (from RMRU photo) of where the climbers were found.
Yellow dots = Possible locations of impact point, with the leftmost being my interpretation of where the RMRU photo locates it.
Green dots = My interpretation of possible belays from which the RMRU report thinks the climbers fell.
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tootsiepop
Nov 16, 2003, 3:47 PM
Post #198 of 221
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Registered: Nov 16, 2003
Posts: 1
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I, like so many others, have followed this thread voraciously, but have not posted till now. These postings, along with my years of memories, have been my companions on the many sleepless nights since finding out about David and Kelly’s fall. I just want to thank everyone who has unknowingly gotten me (and probably many others) through the last few weeks of long nights, low points in the day, and everything else in the middle.
Especially thanks to Jeff for his postings explaining or at least trying to shed light on why this happened, and others, for the details that though heart wrenching to read, brought us to David in his last moments. I just keep expecting David to call and say it was one of his jokes gone bad and ribbing me for not thinking it funny. I’d give anything for the phone to ring…
Thank you to Meg, Adam, and everyone else who was there to help them on the 19th. And Adam, thank you for holding David’s hand, giving comfort, and being there when the rest of us couldn’t. You are all my heroes. You all have a special place in my heart and my prayers, close seconds to Florabel, Nicolas, David’s family and Kelly’s.
David Kellogg meant the world to me. He was my best guy friend, closest confidante, my “Toots”. There isn’t anything I don’t miss about him…except “youknow”. His and my way of putting into words what we couldn’t get across to each other any other way. The void he has left in all of our lives is heinous. But every time I look into that ugly hole in my heart that was his place, I find memories I’d forgotten, images misplaced, dreams we shared with each other, or the occasional “Ah Tootsie Pop!” followed by his contagious laugh. I don’t know when these tears that never seem to stop will ease, but there isn’t a crag of rocks I pass that I won’t think of David and remember him doing a little dance and chanting, “I’m going climbing! I’m going climbing!” And there won’t be a time any of us will be able to look at Nicolas, David’s “Bug”, and not see the man in the child.
Such a beautiful, beautiful man. Such a great friend. A wonderful father and…youknow.
Kari “Tootsie Pop” Steele
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vivalargo
Nov 17, 2003, 1:44 AM
Post #199 of 221
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Registered: Nov 26, 2002
Posts: 1512
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Dear Friends:
I never expected for any of us to nail down exactly what happened in the accident. There were simply too many variables. However there are certain indicators that suggest a general picture.
One climber had a belay device attached to his harness with the rope crimped in it, and that suggests he was actively belaying at the time of the accident. He was also attached to a sling/cordalette configuration tied off to three SLCD's, which on close inspection showed signs of deformation consistant with them being ripped from an anchor point by a significant shock load. Lastly, one (both ?) of the climbers tie-in knots was so tight it couldn't be untied by hand but had to cut -- and what else can this mean except that he fell onto the rope with considerable force, and that the anchor held long enough to fuse his knot.
While any number of scenarios are possible, the most obvious one is that someone was belaying, and someone was climbing. Someone fell, the anchor failed, and the rest we sadly know. If I'd been on hand to inspect the skid marks and impact area I highly doubt I would have put forth anything more definitive that what the RMRU said from the outset. Given all the variables, I have come to resprect and appreciate what the RMRU said in the end, that we will probably never know for sure quite how our fellow climbers died.
Nevertheless, I have found this conversation constructive, but my mind can come up with no more to say. There is a time following the death of every person where we are finally left with the nothing more than the loss, and I wish people grace in that process.
Sincerely,
John Long
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lifestyleclimb
Nov 17, 2003, 3:27 AM
Post #200 of 221
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Registered: Aug 8, 2003
Posts: 18
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I almost quit climbing when I heard about david and kelly's accident, But with the selfless acts of so many climbers, I know that I want to be a part of such a caring and helpful group of people.
Thanks to everyone who took part in this tragic accident.
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